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This contribution firstly reviews developments in the EU and
in the United States on corporate social responsibility and
conflict of laws. It concludes with reference to some related
themes, in particular on the piercing of the corporate veil
and with some remarks on compliance strategy, and compli-
ance reality, for corporations.
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Environmental protection and human rights are core
elements of the so-called ‘corporate social responsibility’
(CSR) agenda. The European Commission has previ-
ously defined corporate social responsibility (CSR) as ‘a
concept whereby companies integrate social and envi-
ronmental concerns in their business operations and in
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary
basis’.1 It has in the meantime changed this to ‘the
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on soci-
ety’2 in order to realign the EU approach to CSR, with
international developments, in particular the Ruggie
report.3
The law is one instrument which can be employed to
further the CSR agenda and the implementation of its
priorities. The United Nations has perhaps somewhat
optimistically referred to the extraterritorial application
of national law as a key element in operationalising
human rights, labour rights and environmental protec-
tion. This proposition suggests ‘developed’ countries
with strong regulatory law (environment, human rights,
labour, even tax) ought to design their laws and their
courts’ application of same in a manner which catches
corporate behaviour outside their territory. In this way,
as long as there is some, even strenuous, link to the
developed state in question (through corporate
headquarters, shareholder structure, board meetings,
marketing of goods and services into those countries,
etc.), the laws of that state would be used as a jack for
regulatory performance abroad. The United States has
been keen in recent years to pursue this route for a
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select number of statutes, particularly in the area of cor-
ruption and export controls. In the EU, the debate has
more generically focused on how conflict of laws could
be employed to increase application of EU law to com-
panies abroad.
These developments join an older cousin in the use of
highly regulated countries (and their courts) in attempt-
ing to up the regulatory stakes in the developing (or less
regulatory caring) world: US case law on the Alien
Torts Statute is often cited as the textbook example of
employing national and international law, applied by
national courts, to further the international community.
This case law, however, was reversed by the same cir-
cuit which launched its application and was subsequent-
ly drastically curtailed by the US Supreme Court.
This contribution firstly reviews developments in the
EU and in the United States on the topic under
consideration. I am of course keenly aware of the core
differences between both approaches. The eye-catching
developments in the United States concern the applica-
tion of public rather than private international law. It is
however the commonality of object (the regulatory jack
identified above) of both developments I am interested
in, rather than the distinction in mode of delivery (pub-
lic cq private international law).
I will conclude with reference to some related themes, in
particular on the piercing of the corporate veil.
This paper is not meant to be exhaustive but rather
explorative.
1 The United States: Litigation
Based on the Alien Tort
Statute
1.1 ATS Discovered by the CSR Community
The Alien Tort Statute, a product of the United States’
first congress, creates a domestic forum for violations of
international law. It is a litigation based on the ATS
which forms the centrepiece as to how the law in the
United States might further the international CSR
agenda.
It is noteworthy that over and above the ATS contro-
versy which we review below, more classic problems
involving in particular recognition and enforcement
have an impact on the CSR debate, too. There is no bet-
ter illustration than what is informally known as Ecuador
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v. Chevron,4 which goes back to Chevron’s acquisition of
Texaco and the pollution caused by Texaco operations
in the area affected, in the 1980s and 1990s. The case
throws light on the difficulties which arise in enforcing a
judgment of a third country in a jurisdiction such as the
United States. Chevron essentially argued that rule of
law principles have been violated in the Ecuadorian rul-
ings on the liability, consequently barring enforcement
in the United States. (It is interesting to note in this
respect that rule of law considerations, in particular
rights of the defence, are one of the very few grounds
which may lead an EU court to reject enforcement of a
judgment of another EU court, under the Brussels I
Regulation.5 The hesitation by US courts to enforce the
Ecuadorian judgments therefore to not ring entirely
alien to EU ears.)
Turning to the subject of the current heading, the rele-
vant text of the ATS reads: 'The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States'.6 Though there
has been some debate over the original intention of Con-
gress in creating the statute, the accepted use of ATS
litigation, in its broadest terms, has become one in
which aliens may bring suit against other foreign
nationals or American citizens for breach of commonly
accepted international norms. The statute remained
unused in the courts for roughly 200 years after its crea-
tion until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980).7 The US Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, the court that serves
Connecticut, New York and Vermont, upheld the
claims of the defendants, Paraguayan nationals, that the
rights of their family member, as defined by interna-
tional law, were violated when another Paraguayan tor-
tured and killed him. Following the success of the trial,
ATS litigation has had an increased presence in US
courts, though the vast majority of claims do not find
the success that Filartiga did. The original trial also set a
precedent for the use of ATS in cases regarding human
rights. A few notable cases have arisen in the last few
decades and have helped to further define the goal of
ATS litigation, though not to an extent that has made
the statute any less controversial.
The ATS case most commonly cited in scholarly
attempts to define the statute and its acceptable uses is
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004).8 In Sosa, a Mexican
national claimed violation of his right to be free from
arbitrary detention when he was abducted and detained
overnight by other Mexican nationals. Though the
court determined that one night of detention followed
by being turned over to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment was not a major violation of international
norms, the results of the case significantly narrowed the
scope of jurisdiction in ATS cases. The court held that
4. For the most recent state of affairs, see my blog at <http://gav-
claw.com/>.
5. Regulation 44/2001, OJ [2001] L12/1.
6. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000).
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004).
in order to qualify for ATS, a plaintiff must provide sig-
nificant evidence for the violation of well-defined and
universally accepted norms of common international
law. The Sosa court made clear the argument that the
statute was not intended to be read broadly, and as such,
future courts should be conservative in terms of recog-
nising new violations of international law. The Court
writes, ‘The judicial power should be exercised on the
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigi-
lant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today’.910
Post Sosa, plaintiffs are burdened with the task of not
only proving that a defendant has violated international
law but that the international law in question is amply
defined as well as a universally accepted and documen-
ted international norm. In the original text of the 1789
statute, there were three requirements: the plaintiff had
to be an alien, allege a tort, and offer evidence towards
the defendant’s guilt in violation of ‘the law of nations’.
The specific ‘law of nations’ was not further defined in
the original text of the document but with the 200-year
gap in cases using ATS, the language did not become
controversial until recent years. After, Sosa plaintiffs
have to provide evidence for a law’s validity by ‘consult-
ing the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law’.11 The plaintiff also had to demonstrate a level of
consensus among nations as well as international treaties
and statutes to demonstrate the validity of an inter-
national norm; however, the Sosa decision drastically
narrowed the scope of documents that may be used to
claim common international law.12 For 200 years, the
Alien Tort Statute was an ill-defined unused piece of
legislation. Until recently more commonly used, each
case brought before US courts employing ATS litiga-
tion further restricted the acceptable use of the statute.
1.2 Corporate Liability under ATS and the
Setback under Kiobel
Whether corporations may be held liable for violations
of international human rights law has long been a topic
of debate in the legal community. At the Nuremberg tri-
als, various German industrialists were convicted of war
crimes including the use of slave labour.13 However,
while the Nuremberg Courts were allowed to find
organisations guilty of war crimes, they could do so only
through the trial of an individual. Essentially, a
corporation could be found criminal but could not be
9. See Sosa.
10. D.D. Caron and R.M. Buxbaum, 'The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview
of Current Issues', 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 2, at 514
(2010).
11. S.M. Morris, 'The Intersection of Equal and Environmental Protection: A
New Direction for Environmental Alien Tort Claims after Sarei and
Sosa', 41 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, at 281 (2010).
12. Ibid., at 283.
13. D. Cassel, 'Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts', 6 Northwestern Journal of International
Human Rights 2, at 306 (2008).
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tried separately, only through an individual who facilita-
ted the corporation’s criminal enterprises.14
The Nuremberg trials are relevant to American ATS
litigation in that their precedents are often consulted by
judges in ATS cases. Notably, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum15 (2010), the second circuit’s verdict relied
heavily on precedents set by international tribunals,
including the Nuremberg trials, in relation to corporate
liability for violation of international law.16
In recent years, the debate has become more focused to
the question of corporate culpability for violations of
human rights rather than simply corporate liability.
Plaintiffs often find corporations a desirable opponent as
they do not have sovereign immunity, and if the trial is
successful, corporations’ resources can more readily be
used to compensate plaintiffs.
Kiobel found that due to what it perceived as a lack of
precedent in international law, corporations cannot be
held liable for violations of customary international law
in US courts under ATS litigation.17 However, this
decision only added to a growing list of corporate ATS
cases with incongruent results. In Doe I v. Unocal Cor-
poration (2002),18 the Ninth Circuit Court unanimously
decided that corporations can be sued for aiding and
abetting foreign human rights violators. Similarly in
Khulamani v. Barclay National Bank Limited (2007),19
the court agreed that corporations can be held liable for
aiding and abetting in violations of international law.20
This lack of congruency among ATS cases involving
corporations was largely due to the fact that most of the
cases are presented before the circuit courts rather than
the Supreme Court.
1.3 The ‘Touch and Concern’ Test of the USSC
in Kiobel
The USSC’s eventual finding in Kiobel21 was eagerly
awaited. The central question in the Court’s finding on
Kiobel turned out to be as follows: whether and under
what circumstances US courts may recognise a cause of
action under the Alien Torts Statute, for violations of
the law of nations, occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States. In focusing on
this question (and replying in the negative), the SC did
not entertain the question which actually led to
certiorari, namely, whether the law of nations recognises
corporate liability.
Certiorari at the Supreme Court was keenly awaited by
the CSR community, for, as noted, ATS litigation by
14. Ibid., at 315.
15. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. Sept. 17,
2010).
16. J.R. Crook, 'Contemporary Practices of the United States Relating to
International Law: International Human Rights: Second Circuit Panel
Finds Alien Tort Statute Does Not Apply to Corporations', 105 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law (2011), at 139.
17. Crook, above n. 16, at 139.
18. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rehearing en banc
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), and vacated and appeal dis-
missed following settlement, 403 F. 3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
19. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
20. Cassel, above n. 13, at 319.
21. USSC No. 10–1491 decided 17 April 2013.
default had become the flag bearer for pursuing alleged
violations of international law (whether in human rights
or environment) by multinational corporations.
Before Kiobel, extraterritorial application of US law had
been under consideration in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank,22 in the area of securities. In Kiobel, the
SC relies on its extensive review of extraterritoriality in
Morrison. It did so even if in Morrison (and other cases
before it), the question of extraterritoriality was one of
merits (also known as ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’): that is,
whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies
abroad. By contrast, in Kiobel, the question concerns
jurisdiction pur sang (also known as jurisdiction to adju-
dicate). For the SC, this did not dent precedent value of
Morrison: 'we think the principles underlying the canon
of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering
causes of action that may be brought under the ATS'. In
Morrison, the SC held that when a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.
In Kiobel, the Court did not find convincing argument
in either text, history or purpose of the ATS, which
could rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The closest such rebuttal arguably lay in the historic
(and more current) examples of employing ATS against
piracy: as the SC notes,
piracy normally occurs on the high seas, beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any
other country, [however] applying U.S. law to pirates
does not typically impose the sovereign will of the
United States onto conduct occurring within the
territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and
therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequen-
ces.
The latter of course is where the core of the argument
lies and where public and private international law prin-
ciples of comity come into play: the degree to which, in
upholding jurisdiction, the courts in ordinary might be
obstructing US foreign policy. This, in my view, is par-
ticularly interesting when one considers the communis
utilitatis roots of modern conflict of laws. The convic-
tion in Dutch conflict of laws in the seventeenth century
(later exported via Scotland to the United States) that
foreign laws needed to be applied if and when they so
wanted, on the basis of reciprocity, and in line with
communis utilitatis has now been turned on its head:
comity is now being used as a presumption against such
application of foreign laws or, here, public international
law.
The SC concludes as follows:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place
outside the United States. And even where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application. See
Morrison, 561 U.S. ___ (slip op. at 17–24). Corpora-
22. No. 10–1491 decided 24 June 2010.
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tions are often present in many countries, and it
would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices. If Congress were to determine oth-
erwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would
be required.
The Court therefore answers Kiobel-type cases (a
foreign plaintiff suing a foreign defendant for acts or
omissions occurring wholly outside of the United States
that allegedly violate the law of nations); however, it did
leave open many questions which fall outside the factual
Kiobel box.
Does the reference to ‘claim’ and ‘territory’ of the
United States refer to the tortious action (thus requiring
that to take place in the United States), or would a US
defendant suffice (in all likelihood: no)? What ‘link’
would be enough for the action to take place in the
United States, in particular lack of corporate oversight
over foreign subsidiaries?
1.4 Post-Kiobel Case Law
Further distinguishing of the USSC test in Kiobel was /
is required and indeed very soon ended up at the SC
again: the US Supreme Court on 14 January 2014
rejected US jurisdiction in Daimler v. Bauman.23 Chief
Justice Roberts’ and concurring opinions in Kiobel as
noted above leave room for further distinguishing.
Daimler does less so. The Court in the end did not
focus too much on the issue of agency and attributability
of a subsidiary’s actions to the mother company. (Daim-
ler is a German corporation that was sued in California
by Argentinian plaintiffs for human rights violations in
Argentina. The Californian link was a subsidiary which
distributes cars there but which is not incorporated
there: its corporate home is Delaware.) Per International
Shoe24, general jurisdiction other than in the state of
incorporation applies only (in the case of foreign compa-
nies) when a foreign company’s ‘continuous corporate
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such
a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activi-
ties’.
Daimler therefore establishes firmly that if you want to
sue a company on the basis of its having its ‘home’ in
the forum, then that home better be exactly that. Not, as
here, merely a condo in the United States when its true
home lies in Germany.
Interestingly (writing for the majority) Judge Ginsburg
(p.23) noted the difference between the Court of
Appeal’s approach and the EU approach when it comes
to overall personal jurisdiction over corporations (she
referred to the recast Brussels I Regulation, 1215/2012,
which is yet to apply but which in substance on this
issue does not differ from the previous version).
However, in reality, there is quite a different direction
(compared to Daimler) which the EU takes vis-à-vis
foreign corporations, in the particular context of B2B
23. USSC No. 11–965.
24. International Shoe v. State of Washington – 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
consumer contracts as well as employment contracts (an
entirely different subject matter, I appreciate).
Finally, in the ‘Apartheid litigation’ [Lungisile Ntsebeza
et al v . Ford General motors and IBM], the Southern
District of New York picked up the issue where
SCOTUS had left it: can corporations be held liable
under the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’) for violations of
‘the law of nations’? Scheindlin USDJ held on
17 April 2014.25 She firstly held that it is federal com-
mon law that ought to decide whether this is so – not
international law itself (ATS being a federal US stat-
ute). Next, she argued that the fact in particular (with-
held by Jacobs J in Kiobel) that few corporations were
ever held to account in a court of law for violations of
public international law was not instrumental in finding
against such liability.
Counsel were instructed to brief on the ‘touch and con-
cern’ test put forward by the Supreme Court in Kiobel,
with the warning that they had to show in particular
that the companies concerned acted ‘not only with the
knowledge but with the purpose to aid and abet the
South African regime’s tortious conduct as alleged in
these complaints’. The case was eventually dismissed at
the end of August 2014, with the decision that the high
bar set by the USCC in Kiobel was not met in current
case. The alleged violation of international law was
inflicted by the South African subsidiaries of the US
defendant corporations, over whom defendants may
have exercised control however control alone, it tran-
spires, is not enough to create sufficient link with the
US to meet the Kiobel test. Applicants had previously
already argued that critical policy level decisions were
made in the US, and that the provision of expertise,
management, technology and equipment essential to the
alleged abuses came from the US. This has now, so it
would seem, been further backed up by detailed facts
however even these facts did not graduate so to speak
the US companies’ involvement from management and
effective control to ‘aiding and abetting’ as Scheindlin
USDJ had instructed counsel to show.
1.5 Summary on the United States
In summary, with Kiobel and Daimler, it is clear that
the scope for ATS litigation has been severely diminish-
ed. Counsel in Apartheid failed to convince the judge
that the touch and concern test was met. (It remains to
be seen whether the issue of corporate culpability will
reach the USSC, too.)
Attention may now be reignited in what has been brew-
ing in the EU for some time: using national courts to
apply national law for conduct abroad – in other words,
classic private international law /conflict of laws coming
to the limelight once again.
25. See <http:// opiniojuris. org/ wp -content/ uploads/ 17 -Apr -SDNY -Opinion.
pdf> (last visited 26 June 2014).
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2 The European Union
In European Private International Law, as with the
ATS, the two main concerns that arise when addressing
matters of corporate violation of rights are whether or
not EU Member State courts have jurisdiction, and if
so, what laws, national or international, apply.26 In the
succinct review below, the analysis will be guided by the
application of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation,27 also known
as the Judgments Regulation, the EEX Regulation or
even the JR. It is the main piece of European
harmonisation, in the area of jurisdiction, for ‘civil and
commercial’ matters, i.e. the mainstream of corporate
and individual litigation.
2.1 Jurisdiction
2.1.1 General Jurisdictional Rule: Article 2 of the
Jurisdiction Regulation
Following the Brussels I Regulation, it is enough for a
court in an EU Member State to establish jurisdiction,
if the defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State.
For corporations, this place is their corporate or
registered seat. Consequently, truly multinational cor-
porations may in theory at least be quite easily pursued
in the courts of an EU Member State, even for actions
committed outside of the EU: the principal jurisdic-
tional ground of the defendant’s domicile, included in
Article 2 of the Jurisdiction Regulation, operates inde-
pendently of the activities to which the action relates.
A good example of the ease in bringing a case against
European holding companies, in the EU, is Milieu-
defensie et al v. Shell.28 Shell’s top holding was hauled
before a Dutch court by a Dutch environmental NGO
(Milieudefensie), seeking (with a number of Nigerian
farmers) to have the mother holding being held liable
for environmental pollution caused in Nigeria.
The media were somewhat wrong-footed in reporting
on the issue. Establishing jurisdiction in an EU court
vis-à-vis a company with seat in the EU is not exactly
string theory. It is a simple application of the Brussels I
Regulation. The European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has
gone as far as to bar national courts from even ponder-
ing rejection of such jurisdiction. In Case C-281/02
Owusu, the ECJ rejected forum non conveniens considera-
tions in a case where the only link to the EU was the
incidental domicile of one of many defendants in the
EU. (The case concerned an action in tort. Defendants
were largely Jamaica based. Facts had taken place in
Jamaica. Under European harmonisation of applicable
law, this law was undoubtedly Jamaican law. The even-
26. Augenstein, n 557 above, 16. See also V. Van Den Eeckhout, 'Promot-
ing Human Rights within the Union: The Role of European Private Inter-
national Law', 105 European Law Journal 127 (2008).
27. Note 5 above.
28. English version of that judgment may be obtained from me by simple e-
mail request. See for analysis also L. Enneking, ‘The Future of Foreign
Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell
Nigeria Case', Utrecht Law Review, at 44-54 (2014) ; and C. Van der
Heijden, ‘De Shell Nigeria Zaak: de eerste Nederlandse foreign direct lia-
bility zaak voor de civiele rechter’, TVR 3, at 71-85 (2013).
tual judgment would have to be recognised and enforced
in Jamaica. Under English conflict of laws, an English
court would have undoubtedly relinquished jurisdiction
in favour of Jamaica.)
What is interesting is the fact that Milieudefensie and
the individual applicants are also pursuing the Nigerian
daughter company in the Netherlands. In an interim
ruling going back to 2009,29 the court held that the case
against the Nigerian daughter could prima facie at least
be joined with the case against the mother holding. (The
judgment on the merits, which I refer to in more detail
below, confirmed this interim finding.)
Pursuing a holding company with domicile in the EU,
therefore, is easy from the jurisdiction point of view.
However, subjecting that company to EU law (or the
national implementation thereof) is more challenging
with respect to applicable law (see below). Staying with
the jurisdictional level, being able to sue the mother
company does not give one an easy day in court vis-à-vis
any daughter companies. Corporate reality dictates that
even though the firms concerned may operate under one
global brand, in practice they are organised in separate
corporate entities. As a result, one will find that
International Business Inc. is actually made up of most
probably as many separate corporate entities as the
countries in which it operates. This reality of singular
corporate domicile for each daughter company rules out
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation vis-à-vis
those daughters with corporate seat outside of the EU.
For those companies lacking domicile in the EU,
national conflicts law (in EU conflicts jargon called
‘residual jurisdiction’) takes over. Some EU Member
States more readily accept jurisdiction against non-EU-
domiciled companies than others. Some, for instance
(notably France), are fairly flexible, allowing plaintiffs
with the nationality of the forum to bring cases to be
brought against anyone incorporated or domiciled any-
where. Others operate some form of a forum necessitatis
rule, allowing anyone with a minimum contact with the
jurisdiction to sue in exceptional circumstances, typical-
ly in some fashion linked to the rule of law.
2.1.2 Special Jurisdictional Rule: Article 5(5)
Jurisdiction Regulation – Operations Arising Out of a
Branch
In the case of corporations, Article 5(5) of the Brussels I
Regulation extends to branches of international compa-
nies by virtue of Article 2(5)’s special jurisdictional rule:
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in
another Member State, be sued: (…)
5. as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of
a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts
for the place in which the branch, agency or other
establishment is situated; (…)
29. BK8616, Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, HA ZA 330891 09-579, Vereniging
Milieudefensie et al v. Royal Dutch Shell plc and Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.
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The use of the words ‘arising out of’ however indicates
the limited potential for this rule in the case of interna-
tional litigation in a CSR context.
This concept of operations (…) also comprises (…)
actions concerning non-contractual obligations aris-
ing from the activities in which the branch, agency or
other establishment within the above defined mean-
ing, has engaged at the place in which it is established
on behalf of the parent body.30
It can hardly be said that the non-contractual
obligations of International Business Ruritania Ltd can
automatically be allocated to International Business [EU
Member State]. They do not ‘arise out of’ the operation
of the EU Member State. Moreover, Article 5(5)
requires International Business Ruritania Ltd to be
domiciled in another EU Member State: it concerns
only defendants already domiciled in a Member State
(Article 5), that is, companies or firms having their seat
in one Member State and having a branch, agency or
other establishment in another Member State. Compa-
nies or firms which have their seat outside the Union
but have a branch in a Member State are covered
instead by Article 4 of the Jurisdiction Regulation. (This
defers to national or residual) (see above) rules of juris-
diction in the case of non-EU-based defendants.)
2.1.3 Special Jurisdictional Rule: Article 5(3)
Jurisdiction Regulation – Tort
The special jurisdictional rule for tort may seem appeal-
ing at first sight. Per Bier,31 the ECJ held that Arti-
cle 5(3) allows litigation in both the locidelicti commissi
(the place where the harmful event leading to, or poten-
tially leading to, the harm occurred) and the locus damni:
the place where the damage occurred. In cases where
the plaintiff is able to show that International Business
with registered seat in an EU Member State is behind
the actions which led to the tort, this grants a jurisdic-
tional trigger. However, as already noted, this is not in
itself a big help for pursuing EU-based multinational
corporations. They can already be pursued on the basis
of Article 2. The bigger issue, as dealt with below, is
how one can pursue that EU mother company on the
basis of EU law.
2.1.4 Special Jurisdictional Rule: Article 5(4)
Jurisdiction Regulation
Courts which have jurisdiction in a criminal procedure
also have jurisdiction for the civil leg of the prosecution.
2.1.5 Review of the Jurisdiction Regulation: The
‘International Dimension’ of the Regulation
The review of the Brussels I Regulation proposed both
an assets-based jurisdictional rule and a forum necessitatis
option, which would have had an impact on the issue
30. Case 33/78, Somafer [1979] ECR 2183, para. 13.
31. Case 21/76, Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735.
discussed here. However, neither of these proposals
were withheld in the eventual Brussels I-bis Regulation.32
2.2 Applicable Law
Establishing jurisdiction leaves open the question of
what law to apply to the facts at issue – as also illustra-
ted by the challenges hitting the application of the ATS.
The EU does not operate an ATS-like system, which
employs international law to advance the case of plain-
tiffs seeking ‘justice’ in environmental or human rights
cases. The CSR-proactive route which must be followed
in the EU is one of Gleichlauf between having a court in
the EU hear the case and having that court apply the
human rights/environmental law of that same forum.33
The most likely route to pursue a corporation in a court
in the EU is via an action in tort. This generally entails
the application of the lex loci damni: that is, the core rule
of the EU’s ‘Rome II’ Regulation.34 Applicable law is
the law of the place where the damage first occurred,
not where the action leading to that damage occurred or
where subsequent indirect damage is felt. Given that
plaintiffs generally do not pursue the case with a view to
having the law of a non-EU Member State apply (they
aim to have EU law being applicable), this general rule
of the Rome II Regulation in all likelihood is not the
goal of the plaintiffs concerned.
Might any of the exceptions in the Rome II Regulation
apply?
If both parties are habitually resident in the same coun-
try when the damage occurs, the law of that country
applies (Article 4(2) Rome II). This may be relevant in
exceptional cases; however, the more standard CSR sce-
nario is for victims resident in the locus damni, outside of
the EU, to sue in the EU. Even if the victims of the tort
subsequently move to the same EU Member State as
the state of incorporation of defendant, this would not
assist: Article 4(2) looks at the time of occurrence of the
damage.
Article 4(3) more generally includes an escape clause:
when it is clear from the circumstances of the case that
it is manifestly more closely connected with a country
other than the one indicated by 4(1) or 4 (2), the law of
that country shall apply instead. ‘The’ tort has to have
that manifestly closer relationship: in particular in the
CSR context, this is problematic given the occurrence of
the damage abroad.
Finally, Article 7 Rome II contains a special rule for
environmental damage:
32. Regulation 1215/2012. See G. Van Calster, 'Le nouveau EEX est arri-
vée’, Rechtskundig Weekblad, ter perse (2014).
33. Given the high degree of harmonisation of environmental law, as well
as (to a slightly lesser degree) of occupational health and safety laws,
and of course the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights
as well as the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant laws of
EU Member State do display a certain amount of harmony.
34. Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obliga-
tions, OJ [2007] L199/40. See detailed analysis in G. Van Calster, EU
Private International Law (Oxford, Hart, 2013) (2nd edn forthcoming
January 2015).
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Article 7
Environmental damage
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation
arising out of environmental damage or damage
sustained by persons or property as a result of such
damage shall be the law determined pursuant to
Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation
for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the
law of the country in which the event giving rise to
the damage occurred.
This article ties in with one of the options for establish-
ing jurisdiction for an EU court, as highlighted above.
One would have to convince a court in an EU Member
State that either direct instructions or negligent lack of
oversight by International Business [EU Member State]
led to the damage at issue and hence constitutes ‘the
event giving rise to the damage’. This is not an easy bur-
den of proof (and one reminiscent of the US judge’s
instruction to counsel in Apartheid35).
Finally, I would argue that the additional rule on ‘rules
of safety and conduct’ of Article 17 arguably have less of
a calling for environmental litigation than may be prima
facie assumed.36
In summary, therefore, while it is relatively straight-
forward in the case of acts committed abroad, to sue a
corporation in the EU, in the case of that corporation
having a corporate bridgehead in the EU, applicable law
almost certainly will not be European law.37 There does
not, at this moment, seem much of a constituency in EU
institutions to have this changed.
In the aforementioned case of Shell, the Court at The
Hague held on 30 January 2013 not on the Basis of the
Rome II Regulation, but rather on the basis of Dutch
conflicts law, for Rome II did not apply ratione tempore.
Therefore, it did not entertain any of the options out-
lined above in that Regulation which may have led to
Dutch law: the events which gave rise to the damage
occurred before the entry into force of that Regulation.
Generally, the judgment is quite comforting for Shell
(and other holding companies in similar situations). It
stuck to its decision to join the cases, hence allowing
Shell Nigeria to be pursued in the Dutch courts, togeth-
er with the holding company (against which as noted
jurisdiction was easily established under the Brussels I
Regulation). The court applied lex loci damni. (If I am
not mistaken, prior to Rome II, the Netherlands applied
a more or less complex conflicts rule, not necessarily
leading to lex loci damni, neither to lex loci delicti commis-
si, which was the rule in most EU Member States prior
to the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation.)
Nigerian law applied and any route to apply Dutch law
was rejected. Incompatibility with Dutch ordre public,
35. Note 25 above and accompanying body text.
36. Contra: V. Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Corporate Human Rights Violations and
Private International Law’, Contemporary Readings in Law and Social
Justice 2 (2012).
37. Similarly, see C. Van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in
Arms. On the Role of Tort Law in the Area of Business and Human
Rights’, 221 Journal of European Tort Law, at 231-32 (2011).
for instance, was not withheld. Nigerian law running
along common law lines, the court ran through negli-
gence in tort, applied to environmental cases, leading
among others to the inevitable English case of Rylands v.
Fletcher. The court found that the damage occurred
because of sabotage, which under Nigerian law in prin-
ciple exonerated Shell Nigeria. Only for two specific
instances of damage was liability withheld, for Shell
Nigeria had failed to take basic precautions. The condi-
tions of the Court of Appeal in Chandler v. Cape38 to
establish liability for the holding company were not
found to be met in the case at issue. The court did not
establish a specific duty of care under Nigerian law
(with the loop to the English common law) for Royal
Dutch Shell (RDS), the mother company. A general
CSR commitment was not found not to alter that.
3 Piercing of the Corporate
Veil and Compliance
Strategies
As the Shell case shows, some form of piercing of the
corporate veil is generally required to lead to successful
pursuit of international holding companies on the basis
of activities of their subsidiaries carried out in less CSR
active jurisdictions. Even in the EU, there is no general
EU rule on the piercing of the corporate veil. Neither
company law nor tort law is sufficiently (or in the case
of tort law even embryonically) harmonised to be able to
speak of much EU influence here.
3.1 Inspiration from Competition Law?
In EU competition law, the principle is more or less
established and may, one suspects, inspire in other
areas, too. In ENI,39 for instance, the ECJ confirmed
the strong presumption of attribution in the case of
shareholder control.
It is established case law under EU competition law that
the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed, for the
purposes of the application of Article 101 TFEU (the
core article disciplining cartel behaviour), to the parent
company particularly where, although having separate
legal personality, that subsidiary does not autonomously
determine its conduct on the market but mostly applies
the instructions given to it by the parent company. The
ECJ (and national courts taking its lead) will have regard
in particular to the economic, organisational and legal
links which unite those two legal entities. In such a sit-
uation, since the parent company and its subsidiary
form part of a single economic unit and thus form a sin-
gle undertaking for the purpose of Article 101 TFEU,
the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that the Com-
mission may address a decision imposing fines to the
38. [2012] EWCA Civ 525.
39. Case T-39/07, not yet published in ECR.
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parent company without being required to establish its
individual involvement in the infringement.
In the particular case in which a parent company holds
all or almost all of the capital in a subsidiary which has
committed an infringement of the EU competition
rules, there is a rebuttable presumption that that parent
company exercises an actual decisive influence over its
subsidiary. In such a situation, it is sufficient for the
Commission to prove that all or almost all of the capital
in the subsidiary is held by the parent company in order
to take the view that that presumption is fulfilled.
In addition, in the specific case where a holding compa-
ny holds 100% of the capital of an interposed company
which, in turn, holds the entire capital of a subsidiary of
its group which has committed an infringement of EU
competition law, there is also a rebuttable presumption
that that holding company exercises a decisive influence
over the conduct of the interposed company and also
indirectly, via that company, over the conduct of that
subsidiary.
In ENI, for the entire duration of the infringement in
question, Eni held, directly or indirectly, at least
99.97% of the capital in the companies which were
directly active within its group in the sectors in which
there had been a violation of competition law. The ECJ
held that in particular the absence of management over-
lap between Eni and the daughter companies was not
enough to rebut the presumption of the companies
being a single economic unit.
3.2 Outside of Competition Law
In competition law, therefore, the corporate veil may be
quite easily pierced in a holding context, at the very
least for transfer of fines. This is undoubtedly not the
approach which many Member States take outside of
the competition law area. The waters on the piercing of
the corporate veil other than in the area of competition
law remain quite deep. This has an impact on the con-
flicts area, in particular in the application of the Rome II
Regulation (as noted, the core rule for conflict of laws in
torts) and the debate on corporate social responsibility.
This point was also made by, e.g. the UK Supreme
Court on 12 June 2013 in Petrodel v. Prest40 (a matrimo-
nial assets case which was decided on the basis of trust),
where Lord Neuberger stated obiter 'if piercing the cor-
porate veil has any role to play, it is in connection with
evasion'. Lord Sumption’s take was
there is a limited principle of English law which
applies when a person is under an existing legal obli-
gation…which he deliberately evades or whose
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing
a company under his control. The court may then
pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for
the purpose, of depriving the company or its control-
ler of the advantage that they would otherwise have
obtained by the company’s separate legal personality.
40. [2013] UKSC 34.
He added
The principle is properly described as a limited one,
because in almost every case where the test is
satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal rela-
tionship between the company and its controller
which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corpo-
rate veil.
Lord Clarke, agreeing with Lord Mance and others, sta-
ted 'the situations in which piercing the corporate veil
may be available as a fall-back are likely to be very rare'.
Piercing issues were also sub judice in VTB41 – without
much holding on the merits. VTB’s case was that it was
induced in London to enter into a Facility Agreement,
and an accompanying interest rate swap agreement, by
misrepresentations made by one of the defendants, for
which it claims the other respondents are jointly and
severally liable. Parties are of suitably diverse domicile
(appellant incorporated in England however controlled
by a state-owned bank in Moscow; defendants two
British Virgin Island-based companies owned and con-
trolled by a Moscow-based Russian businessman).
Defendants not being EU-based, the Brussels-I Regula-
tion did not not apply.
The issues involved were essentially:
1. Lord Neuberger made the point that settling the
presence (or not) of jurisdiction is an early procedural
incident in a trial and ought not to lead to protracted
legal argument, costs and time, lest the discussions
centre around whether the potential other jurisdic-
tion can guarantee a fair trial or not. In contrast with
other recent high-profile cases before the UK courts,
the alternative, Russian forum, would by common
agreement have also offered a fair trial. Lord
Neuberger also emphasises, with reference to Lord
Bingham in Lubbe v. Cape, that in forum non conven-
iens considerations, appeal judges should defer in
principle to the trial judge and that this should be no
different in proceedings concerning service out of
jurisdiction. The majority therefore opted to defer to
Arnold J (at the High Court) and the Court of Appeal
in their finding of jurisdiction, in the absence of any
error which ought to have made the former change
their conclusion.
2. Applicable law for tortious misrepresentation. This
the law of the jurisdiction in which they are ultimate-
ly received and relied upon (the forum connogati if
you like). In the case at issue, this was held to be
England.
3. Applicable law for piercing the corporate veil. The
Court emphasises the foundation of individual per-
sonality of a company established in Salomon and A
Salomon and Co Ltd (1897). The presumption must
be against piercing. The Supreme Court did not
however set out a definitive test for it was not neces-
sary for its resolving of the case, neither did it decide
41. 2013] UKSC 5.
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what law should apply to the issue. In theory, Lord
Neuberger suggested
the proper law governing the piercing of the corpo-
rate veil (may be) the lex incorporationis, the lex fori,
or some other law (for example, the lex contractus,
where the issue concerns who is considered to be
party to a contract entered into by the company in
question).
However, common ground among parties in the case
thus far had been to apply English law, and the issue of
choice of law for piercing the corporate veil was not fur-
ther reviewed.
That would seem to be the general line held by case law
across the EU: if the relevance for deciding applicable
law to the piercing issue is at all identified, parties and
courts generally happily continue with the application of
lex causae42 rather than conducting the analysis using
traditional conflict of laws methodology.
4 Conclusion
It may be the cynic’s view that in the absence of inter-
nationally followed principles, in particular on piercing
the corporate veil, companies will continue to organise
their corporate structure with a view to forum and
applicable law shopping. However, paraphrasing Judge
Jacobs in Kiobel, immoral behaviour is few companies’
business plan. This does not mean that one need not
address the current uncertainty with respect to the pos-
sibility to pursue business in EU or other courts on the
basis of arguably stricter tort, health and safety, envi-
ronmental, etc. laws in those states. For if nothing else,
the current disparate approach does not exactly assist in
creating the level playing field necessary for internation-
al business integration.
42. See also S. Demeyere, ‘Liability of a Mother Company within the EU for
a Foreign Subsidiary – Study under French, Belgian and English Law',
forthcoming.
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